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COMMENTS
In Nebraska the buyer probably would not be able to rescind
the contract of sale with Saks because he did obtain the thing
for which he contracted, and could not show pecuniary damage,
an essential element when the misrepresentation concerns an
extraneous fact about something other than the article to be sold.
The holding in the instant case that no showing of pecuniary
damage is necessary to rescind a transaction for fraudulent
misrepresentation is in accord with the majority of American
decisions. However, it is possible that neither the majority nor
minority view ought to be applied uncritically in all cases. There
are a great many policy considerations, not yet well defined by
the courts, which should be extremely influential in helping the
courts decide to allow or deny rescission. In the present case
the donor was completely innocent, intentionally defrauded, and
induced by the fraudulent misrepresentations to make a gift. In
allowing the defrauded donor to rescind, the court was perhaps
strongly influenced by the bad faith of Saks, a store with sup-
posedly high integrity. Stronger and more definite policy con-
siderations might govern other cases.24
RONALD CUPPLES
REAL PROPERTY-"To MY WIFE So LONG As SHE MAY REMAIN
MY WIDOW"-ETERMINABLE FEE OR LIFE ESTATE?
Plaintiff's father devised to his wife his ". . . entire estate
both real and personal.., to have as long as she may remain my
widow, in case my widow should remarry it is my will that she
receive her lawful portion the same as if this will had never been
written." The widow died testate without having remarried.
She bequeathed the sum of $100 to plaintiff and the residue of
her estate to her other children, defendants, equally. Plaintiff
party merely wants to be relieved of his contractual obligations and should
not be denied relief because he has not incurred damages.
24. For example, in Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn. 338, 53 AtI. 729 (1902),
plaintiff, who had sold his land to defendant as the result of fraudulent
misrepresentations that the sale was to another person, was allowed to re-
scind. The defendant proposed to operate a boarding house, and the plaintiff
had an understanding with his neighbors that none of them would sell for
this purpose. Here the property of the plaintiff's neighbors might have been
depreciated leaving them without a right to sue anyone, and the plaintiff
might at the same time have suffered in their esteem, although he had
actually done his best to observe their agreement. It is submitted that the
policy considerations in favor of allowing relief in this case are far stronger
than they are in the principal case.
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contended that the language of her father's will gave her mother
a life estate only, determinable upon her remarriage, and that,
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to a share of her father's estate
as one of his heirs. Defendants contended that their mother took
a determinable fee simple, and that since she had not remarried,
the property could be devised to them in fee simple absolute.1
- In holding that the language created a fee simple determinable,
the court stated that the words of the will, when considered as a
whole, evinced an intent to pass the maximum possible estate
consistent with the special limitation; and that if the testator
had intended to give his widow less than a fee simple, he should
have expressly limited the estate to her for life. In reasoning
that more express language was necessary to restrict the estate
to one for the widow's life, the court paraphased the Kentucky
statute which reverses the common law presumption that a fee
is not intended unless expressly so limited by the conveyance or
devise. The court further relied on the rule of construction that
execution of a will creates a presumption that the testator in-
tended to die wholly testate, and that the court should effectuate
that intention whenever possible. 3
The sole issue presented by the case is whether the words "so
long as she remains my widow" create a determinable fee or a
determinable life estate. Courts in various jurisdictions have had
to consider and weigh several factors in solving this problem.4
, Ordinarily, no single factor is of sufficient importance to con-
trol the decision. Usually some combination of several elements
provides the basis for a particular result. It is clearly impossible
to evaluate the factors individually in terms of their relative
weight. Their importance will vary from case to case with the
presence or absence of other determinants. It may be generalized,
however, that when the number of factors on each side is ap-
1. Taylor v. Farrow, 239 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1951).
2. (1) Unless a different purpose appears by express words or [by]
necessary inference, every estate in land created by deed or will, without
words of inheritance, shall be deemed as fee simple or such other estate as
the grantor or testator has power to dispose of. KY. RMa. STAT. § 381.060
<1948).
3. This position is often taken by the courts in Kentucky and other juris-
dictions. Pumroy v. Jenkins, 151 Kan. 466, 99 P.2d 752 (1940) ; Cuddy v.
McIntyre, 312 Ky. 606, 229 S.W.2d 315 (1950) ; Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson,
282 Ky. 181, 138 S.W.2d 365 (1940); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 168 Ky. 286, 181
S.W. 1116 (1916) ; Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. 301, 33 At. 330 (1895).
4. See Note, 122 A.L.R. 75-92 (1939), wherein the various factors are
further illustrated, and cases containing one or more factors are presented.
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proximately the same, the predictability of decision is slight, but
as the number of factors on one side increases, particularly with
a corresponding decrease in the number of those on the other
side, the accuracy of prediction increases.
Although these factors do not usually occur singly, it is never-
theless necessary to discuss them individually in the interest of
clarity.
The following factors are conducive to a finding that a de-
terminable fee simple was created:
1. The fact that a contrary holding would result in the widow's
getting an estate of less value than she would have received had
she waived her rights under the will and taken her statutory dis-
tributive share.5
This is based on an inference that the testator intended to
benefit his wife by providing for her in his will, and in order to
do this he must have intended that she receive more under the
will than she would have gotten had he devised no property to
her. This inference seems correct when the will has been drawn
by a lawyer, since he, in all probability, advised the testator of
the intestacy statutes; but whether the inference remains valid
when the deceased executes his own will is less certain.
2. The fact that the wife has been given part of the same prop-
erty in fee upon her remarriage.,
Representative of cases where this factor is found is Redding
5. Pumroy v. Jenkins, 151 Kan. 466, 99 P.2d 752 (1940); Vaughn v.
Vaughn, 97 Va. 322, 33 S.E. 603 (1899). The court in the principal case
reasons that the deceased testator intended to pass whatever estate he had
(an absolute fee) but qualified or limited only in case his widow might
remarry.
6. Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577, 92 N.E. 970 (1910); Staack v. Det-
terding, 182 Iowa 582, 161 N.W. 44 (1917); Pumroy v. Jenkins, 151 Kan.
446, 99 P.2d 752 (1940) ; Hutter v. Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 7 S.W. 2d 315
(1950) ; Davis v. Bennett's Executor, 272 Ky. 674, 114 S.W.2d 1150 (1938) ;
Mann v. Frese, 203 Ky. 739, 263 S.W. 21 (1924) ; Hinkle v. Hinkle, 168 Ky.
286, 181 S.W. 1116 (1916); In re Biles' Will, 8& Misc. 452, 151 N.Y. Supp.
1097 (Surr. Ct. 1914) ; Weiss v. City of Mt. Vernon, 157 App. Div. 383, 142
N.Y. Supp. 250 (2nd Dept. 1913) ; Anderson v. Anderson, 150 Ore. 476, 46
P.2d 98 (1935); Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. 301, 33 Atl. 330 (1895); In re
Baird's Will, 171 Wis. 215, 177 N.W. 23 (1920). In Anderson v. Anderson,
supra, the testator devised "to my wife all my estate so long as she shall
remain my widow, relying upon her to properly rear. . . our two children.
In case she remarries it is my will that she then take for her sole use and
benefit, % of all the property then remaining. . . ." Deciding that the
widow's estate was a fee, determinable on her remarriage, the Oregon Su-
preme Court said that the better reasoned and more recent authorities
incline to the view that in instances in which the devise is to the widow
conditionally and there is no disposal of the remainder upon her death un-
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V. Rice,7 in which the will gave to the wife all of the testator's
real and personal property so long as she remained his widow,
"... and if she should get married, then she shall be only entitled
to the one-third in said property, the balance... to my youngest
daughter... ." In holding that the wife took a fee simple de-
terminable in two-thirds of the property and a fee simple abso-
lute in the other one-third, the court advanced among other
reasons" that since the testator must have intended his widow
to have more if she did not remarry, the devise must have cre-
ated a determinable fee rather than a determinable life estate
in the two-thirds.
3. The fact that there is neither a gift over nor a residuary
clause.9
The absence of both a gift over and residuary clause would
result in partial intestacy should the court find that only a de-
terminable life estate was created. The presumption against
partial intestacy influences courts to hold that a determinable
fee is created under such circumstances.10
married, the widow takes a determinable fee simple estate. The court also
cited with approval and in support In re Baird's Will, supra; Glass v. John-
son, 297 Ill. 149, 130 N.E. 413 (1921); Squier v. Harvey, 16 R.I. 226, 14
At. 862 (1888); Staack v. Detterding, supra. The Squier case, supra, is
extremely liberal in its approach and would probably be limited to its facts
by the more conservative courts.
The early English case of Gay v. Deveron, 12 Sim. 200, 59 Eng. Rep. 1108
(1841) involved a novel situation. The testator devised his property to his
wife for life but if she should remarry to his daughter for life; he also
made his wife residuary devisee provided she did not remarry. Thus the
widow in addition to presently enjoying a determinable life estate took a de-
terminable fee simple by remainder, with a possibility of merger taking
place should she alienate her entire interest.
7. 171 Pa. 301, 33 Atl. 330 (1895).
8. Among these other factors was the existence of a statute similar in
content and purpose to the Kentucky act in the principal case.
9. Glass v. Johnson, 297 Ill. 149, 130 N.E. 473 (1920) ; Cummings v. Lohr,
246 Ill. 577, 92 N.E 970 (1910) ; Beatty v. Irwin, 35 Ind. App. 238, 73 N.E.
926 (1905); Staack v. Detterding, 182 Iowa 582, 161 N.W. 44 (1917);
Pumroy v. Jenkins, 151 Kan. 466, 99 P.2d 752 (1940) ; Cuddy v. McIntyre,
312 Ky. 606, 229 S.W.2d 315 (1950); Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky.
181, 138 S.W.2d 365 (1940); Walton v. Jones, 216 Ky. 289, 287 S.W. 710(1926); Gaven v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293, 13 S.W. 501 (1890); Anderson v.
Anderson, 119 Neb. 381, 229 N.W. 124 (1930); Weiss v. City of Mt. Vernon,
157 App. Div. 383, 142 N.Y. Supp. 250 (2nd Dept. 1913); Hults v. Holzbach,
233 Pa. 367, 82 AtI. 469 (1912) ; Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. 301, 33 Atl. 330
(1895); Squier v. Harvey, 16 R.I. 226, 14 Atl. 862 (1888); Haring v.
Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 122 S.W. 13 (1909); Foote v. Foote, 76 S.W.2d 194
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
10. Of course partial intestacy cannot be entirely avoided since the
possibility of reverter after the fee will remain undevised. However, there
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/10
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4. The existence of a statute abrogating the common law re-
quirement that words of inheritance be used in order to create a
fee simple and stating that every estate in land created by deed
or will shall be deemed a fee simple or such other estate as the
grantor or testator had the power to dispose of in the absence
of express words to the contrary."
While the courts have not felt that such a statute is absolutely
determinative that a fee simple determinable results under the
circumstances considered here, nevertheless, the existence of
such a statute has been accorded great weight in finding a de-
terminable fee to have been created. In fact no case has been
found involving such a statute in which the court held that a
determinable life estate was created, unless there were express
words so limiting the interest.
In addition to these factors, there are certain considerations
of policy which have influenced different courts in varying de-
grees to find that a determinable fee has been created. Among
them are (1) the fact that the widow is often charged with the
responsibility of raising the family after the husband's death,
(2) the fact that circumstances may change so that it is highly
desirable that the property be sold in order to accomplish that
purpose, in which case it is desirable to have as marketable an
is nothing the courts can do about disposing of this ordinarily rather in-
significant interest.
11. Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577, 92 N.E. 970 (1910); Pumroy v.
Jenkins, 151 Kan. 466, 99 P.2d 752; Cuddy v. McIntyre, 312 Ky. 606, 229
S.W.2d 315 (1950); Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky. 181, 138 S.W.2d
365 (1940) ; Hutter v. Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 7 S.W.2d 1043 (1928) ; Walton
v. Jones 216 Ky. 289, 287 S.W. 710 (1926); Mann v. Frese, 203 Ky. 739,
263 S.W. 21 (1924); Prindible v. Prindible, 186 Ky. 280, 216 S.W. 583
(1919) ; Anderson v. Anderson, 119 Neb. 381, 229 N.W. 124 (1930) ; Weiss
v. City of Mt. Vernon, 157 App. Div. 383, 142 N.Y. Supp. 250 (2nd Dept.
1913) ; Hults v. Holzbach, 233 Pa. 367, 82 Atl., 469 (1912) ; Redding v. Rice,
171 Pa. 301, 33 Atl. 330 (1895) ; In re Baird's Will, 171 Wis. 215, 177 N.W.
23 (1920). Anderson v. Anderson, supra, is a typical case. There the
testator devised ".. to my wife as long as she shall remain my widow...
and if she should remarry, my property is to go to my children then living
except as to her dower, over which I have no control." The court reasoned
that the widow took a determinable fee in accordance with the provisions of
the Nebraska statute, one similar to that in Taylor v. Farrow. By way of
dicta, it was said that had the widow sold her estate to a third party, that
party would take title subject to the defeasance upon the widow's remar-
riage. Most jurisdictions agree with this limitation on the purchaser's title;
but, in Gaven v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293, 13 S.W. 501 (1890), the widow was
able to pass an absolute fee to the purchaser. She had also been given a
power of sale over the devised realty, and the court said it was the testator's
intent to give his widow power to pass the full fee, even though her own
estate was only a determinable fee.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
interest in the property as possible, (3) the overall desirability
of dividing estates "duration-wise" as little as possible. Al-
though these considerations of policy are seldom made explicit
in the opinions, it is reasonably certain that they underlie many
decisions.
On the other hand, the following factors are conducive to a
finding that a determinable life estate was created :12
1. The fact that the executor has been given a power of sale
over the testator's realty.13
In this situation a holding that the widow took a determinable
fee would for all practical purposes nullify the power of sale in
the executor, since at most there would be a possibility of re-
verter left to sell. If the possibility of reverter is not accompanied
by a reversion (as is the case where it follows a determinable
fee rather than a determinable life estate) it cannot be alienated
inter vivos in some jurisdictions, and, even in those jurisdictions
where it is alienable, under circumstances such as these it would
not be a readily marketable interest.
2. The fact that words of inheritance are used in other parts
of the will to create fee simple interests and are not used in con-
nection with the gift to the widow until remarriage.14
In this situation the words of the will itself make it clear that
12. Of course where the will contains a gift over or residuary devise to
take effect either in the event of death or remarriage it is clear that the
testator intended to restrict his widow's estate to her life. In each of the
cases cited below the court found the testator intended that the remainder-
man or residuary devisee take in any event no later than the death of the
widow, thus giving her a determinable life estate. Brunk v. Brunk, 167 Iowa
51, 137 N.W. 1065 (1912); Koonz v. Hempy, 142 Iowa 337, 120 N.W. 976(1909) ; Mouser v. Srygler, 295 Ky. 490, 174 S.W.Zd 756 (1943) ; Napier v.
Davis, 7 J.J. Marsh 283 (Ky. 1832) ; Peck v. Griffis, 148 Mich. 682, 112 N.W.
722 (1907); Place v. Burlingame, 75 Hun 432, 27 N.Y. Supp. 674 (1894);
affd. 149 N.Y. 617 44 N.E. 1128 (1896).
13. Long v. Hill, 29 Pa. Super. 606 (1905). But what would a court de-
cide if, as is so often the case, the widow is also the sole executrix? If the
widow were also given the fee estate, her having a sterile power of sale
should be no problem.1 14. Schaeffer v. Messersmith, 10 Penn Co. Ct. Rep. 366 (1890). Such
distinctions, however, have been dropped by most modern courts since they
prefer to look to the content of the whole will instead of picking phrases out
of their context to pounce upon as being indicative of any special intent
(or lack thereof) in the testator. It has been held that the fact that per-
sonalty has been bequeathed absolutely to the widow in the same will which
devises the realty conditionally indicates an intent to give a "fee" interest
in the personalty, but only a life estate in the realty. Peck v. Griffis, 148
oMich. 682, 112 N.W. 722 (1907). Such reasoning is not persuasive in the
least, for there is no correlation between the quantum of estate granted and
the fact that it is conditional.
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the testator was aware of the technicalities involved in creating
a fee simple interest, and his failure to use the same words in
connection with the gift during widowhood is some indication
of an intention to create an estate of less duration than those
he gave elsewhere in the will.
An analysis of the principal case in terms of the foregoing
factors leads to the conclusion that it was correctly decided. 5
Neither of the factors which would suggest that only a determin-
able life estate was intended were present. On the other hand a
holding that only a determinable life estate was created would
have resulted in the wife's taking less than her statutory distribu-
tive share; she had been given part of the same property in fee
upon her remarriage; there was neither a gift over in the case
of remarriage nor a residuary clause; and finally the Kentucky
statute almost demands this decision.
It is submitted that in the absence of express language limiting
the estate created to one for life, statutes such as the Kentucky
act leave little room for the application of the other factors sug-
gested above. The only problem for determination under such a
statute is whether express words to the contrary are present. It
is certainly true that words of limitation such as "until remar-
riage" or "so long as she remains unmarried" are not express
words to the contrary within the meaning of those terms in the
statute. Such words should not be regarded as words measuring
the quantum of the estate, but rather as words relating only to
15. In holding that the widow took a determinable fee rather than a mere
determinable life estate, the Kentucky Court of Appeals had ample support
for its position in the five Kentucky cases cited by the defendants, namely:
Cuddy v. McIntyre, 812 Ky. 606, 229 SW.2d 315 (1950); Hopson's Trustee
v. Hopson, 282 Ky. 181, 138 S.W.2d 865 (1940) ; Hutter v. Crawford, 225
Ky. 215, 7 S.W.2d 1043 (1928); Mann v. Frese, 203 Ky. 739, 263 S.W. 21(1924); Prindible v. Prindible, 186 Ky. 280, 216 S.W. 583 (1919). Howeverin so finding for the defendants, the court was forced to distinguish (and
even too a certain extent overrule) several Kentucky cases submitted by the
plaintiff, namely; Thomas v. Stafford, 305 Ky. 559, 204 S.W.2d 940 (1947);
Mouser v. Srygler, 295 Ky. 490, 174 S.W.2d 756 (1943); Morgan v. Chris-
tian, 142 Ky. 14, 133 S.W. 982 (1911) ; Napier v. Davis, 7 J.J. Marsh 283(Ky. 1832). In Mouser v. Srygler, supra, the novel situation of a father's
devise to his daughter so long as she remained a widow was presented. The
devise expressly limited the estate to the daughter's life by using the dis-junctive "or" between the terms "remain a widow" and "she remarried,"
thus showing that the estate was to determine in either of two ways, by her
death ending widowhood, or by remarriage ending widowhood. Therefore,
the court said it was the testator's intent not to give the fee to the daughter.
The other cases mentioned were distinguished on similar factual differences
between them and the principal case.
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the happening of a particular contingency, i.e., remarriage of
the widow.
In addition the suggested solution is desirable in view of the
policy considerations mentioned above. In normal circumstances
the duty of raising a family falls upon the widow, and the task
is often a difficult one. In many cases the necessity for selling
the property arises, perhaps because it is not a good income-
producing property in its present condition, and no money is
available to improve the property. Selling a life estate is a diffi-
cult thing at best, and more often than not results in the seller's
getting relatively little for her interest. Finally, it has as a
general proposition been considered desirable to place as much
of the total quantum of possible estates in one person so as to
increase marketability, and thus advance the overall objective
of free alienability.
IRA FLEISCHMANN
PERSONAL PROPERTY-PARTIES TO A MARRIAGE WHICH NEVER
MATERIALIZES HELD TENANTS IN COMMON OF THE WEDDING
GIFTS.
Plaintiff and defendant received wedding gifts at three parties
given in honor of their engagement. Each gift was accompanied
by a card reading, "To Janet and Seymour," plaintiff and de-
fendant respectively. When the couple subsequently ended their
engagement by mutual consent, plaintiff demanded the gifts,
which defendant had been storing at his home for safekeeping.
Upon defendant's refusal to surrender them, plaintiff instituted
a replevin action. At no time did any of the donors express a
desire for the return of the gifts, nor did either of the litigants
make such a tender."
Refusing to take judicial notice of the social custom contended
for by plaintiff, namely that the intended bride is entitled to the
wedding gifts, the court found that plaintiff and defendant owned
the gifts as tenants in common. Once that determination had
been made, plaintiff's action necessarily failed. One tenant in
common is deemed to hold for the benefit of his co-owners, and
hence another co-tenant has no grounds for demanding that the
person already in possession relinquish the goods.2
1. Mandelbaum v. Weiss, 11 N.J. Super. 27, 77 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1950).
2. Garrett v. MeAtee, 195 Ark. 1123, 115 S.W.2d 1092 (1938); Kleinfeld
v. General Auto Sales Co., 118 N.J.L. 67, 191 Atl. 460 (1937).
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